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Despite documented best practices and specialized tools, managers continue to face major challenges in software 
development. While managers are traditionally advised to choose between plan-driven and agile principles, software 
organizations increasingly face situations in which they need to take advantage of both. There is, however, limited actionable 
advice on how managers can shape the organizational context to develop such capability. We therefore combine theory on 
ambidexterity and contextualist inquiry to report from a two-year action research study at TelSoft. As a result, we propose a 
model for how software organizations can become ambidextrous through the processes of diagnosing, visioning, intervening, 
and practicing and discuss the implications for research and practice into software management.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Despite documented best practices and specialized tools, software organizations struggle to deliver quality software that is on 
time, within budget, and meets customer requirements (The Standish Group International, 2004). To improve outcomes, 
software managers are traditionally advised to choose between plan-driven and agile principles. Plan-driven principles 
emphasize discipline through documentation of milestones, requirements, and designs (Boehm, 2002; Boehm and Turner, 
2004). Agile principles emphasize responsiveness and flexibility by giving priority to people and prototypes over processes 
and documentation (Agile Alliance, 2001; Highsmith and Cockburn, 2001). 
In the past, there have been staunch advocates for one strategy over the other. More recently, researchers have started to 
explore how software firms can overcome this dichotomy and achieve the benefits of both simultaneously (Boehm et al., 
2004; Holmberg and Mathiassen, 2001; Lee, DeLone and Espinosa, 2006; Lee, DeLone and Espinosa, 2007; Napier, 
Mathiassen and Johnson, 2006a; Salo and Abrahamsson, 2005; Vinekar, Slinkman and Nerur, 2006). The integration of such 
opposing strategies requires, however, software firms to become ambidextrous. Ambidextrous organizations simultaneously 
pursue contradictory capabilities such as exploration-exploitation (Tushman and O'Reilly III, 1996), alignment-adaptability 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), and flexibility-efficiency (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999). While studies have begun to 
provide general empirical support for a positive relationship between ambidexterity and organizational performance (Gibson 
et al., 2004; He and Wong, 2004), there are at this point no research studies into how software organizations can effectively 
overcome traditional dichotomies. 
Our objective is therefore to explore how software organizations can develop ambidextrous capability to overcome the 
dichotomy between alignment based on plan-driven principles and adaptability based on agile principles. The research is 
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framed as a two-year action research study (Mathiassen, 2002; McKay and Marshall, 2001; Susman and Evered, 1978) into 
practices at TelSoft. Adopting action research principles allowed us to get deep and first-hand insight into how ambidexterity 
was approached and developed over time. Contextualist inquiry (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987) provided a general framing of the 
study in line with our focus on contextual ambidexterity. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Contextual Ambidexterity
In general, ambidexterity refers to the capacity of organizations to manifest opposing characteristics at the same time. In 
particular, contextual ambidexterity requires simultaneous success at both alignment – the capacity of employees within the 
business unit to work toward common goal, and adaptability – the capacity of the business unit to change quickly in response 
to dynamic market conditions (Gibson et al., 2004). This perspective recognizes that the day-to-day activities of individual 
employees shape and reflect ambidexterity. Therefore, the top management team is charged with creating an organizational 
context that facilitates ambidextrous practices.
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) identify two salient aspects of the organizational context that can be manipulated to increase 
alignment and adaptability: performance management and social support. Performance management represents systems, 
processes, and beliefs related to performance objectives set by the organization’s management (Gibson et al., 2004); 
discipline is an attribute that encourages people to voluntarily meet those objectives whereas stretch is an attribute that 
encourages people to strive for even more ambitious goals (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). Social support represents systems, 
processes, and beliefs associated with member relationships (Gibson et al., 2004); trust is an attribute of the organizational 
context that encourages people to rely on one another whereas support is an attribute that empowers people to lend assistance 
to others (Ghoshal et al., 1994).
Contextualist Inquiry
Contextualist inquiry (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987) focuses on how content, context, and process interact to transform 
organizations (see Figure 1). Content refers to the areas being transformed, in this case, managerial practices at TelSoft.
Context refers to the systems, processes, and beliefs within the organization through which ideas for change have to proceed, 
in this case, changes to the performance management and social support context. Process refers to the actions and 
interactions between interested parties as they attempt to transform practices, in this case, the actions and interactions related 











Figure 1: Contextualist Inquiry into Becoming Ambidextrous
Contextualist inquiry involves process orientation and multiple levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987). Emphasizing the 
interconnectedness of phenomena in historical, present, and future time, we focus on how past events at TelSoft shaped its 
attempts to build ambidextrous capability and how these events created a basis for moving forward. In addition, we focus on 
how individuals engaged in project portfolio management, how groups of managers interacted to become ambidextrous, and 
the wider context of the organization and its interactions with existing and potential customers. 
Napier et al. Transcending Traditions in Software Management
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 3
RESEARCH METHOD
Action researchers use a mixture of research methods such as participant observation, interviews, document analysis, and 
surveys as they seek to simultaneously contribute to practical problem solving and scientific development (Rapoport, 1970). 
This makes action research an excellent candidate for studying longitudinal organizational change processes (Pettigrew, 
1990). This study is based upon collaborative practice research (Mathiassen, 2002), a particular form of action research that is 
characterized by strong collaboration between practitioners and researchers to effect change. The dual goal of the research is
to improve management practices at TelSoft and to contribute to scientific knowledge on ambidextrous software 
management. 
TelSoft, a privately held company founded in 1971, customizes geographic information systems (GIS) software for the 
telecommunications and utility industries. A software unit with approximately 50 members is the focus of our study. TelSoft
is oriented toward known customers in a niche market; it has high reliance on committed employees who perform many roles 
within the organization; and it has few resources devoted to innovation (Horvat, Rozman and Györkös, 2000). Although not 
considered a market leader, TelSoft has a reliable customer base consisting of two large customers that drive innovation to 
their core software products and several hundred smaller customers that use TelSoft’s standardized geographic mapping 
software. Struggling to survive in a competitive environment, TelSoft frequently neglected innovation and adaptation, and 
instead emphasized known customers, products, and services.
At the time our study began in 2004, TelSoft was experiencing severe issues with their main customers: software releases 
were frequently shipped late, ran over budget, and contained deviations from agreed upon requirements. These issues 
prompted management to focus on process innovation supported by this action research project. Several innovation projects 
were initiated and have been the focus of other research (Napier et al., 2006a; Napier, Mathiassen and Johnson, 2006b); 
however, this study focuses on the efforts that occurred to innovate project portfolio management, i.e., the systematic 
management of the company’s projects in order to decide which projects should be added or removed as well as the relative 
priority of projects within that portfolio (De Reyck, Grushka-Cockayne, Lockett, Calderini, Moura and Sloper, 2005; 
Markowitz, 1952; McFarlan, 1981). In software firms like TelSoft, project portfolio management is a core management 
activity requiring ongoing assessment of existing projects and new business opportunities (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; 
Hobday, 2000). 
Data collection occurred in four phases: diagnosing, visioning, intervening, and practicing as summarized in Table 1. Data 
analysis proceeded across project phases and informed activity in subsequent phases. To address the question of 
ambidexterity, we coded data reflecting the concepts of performance management, social support, alignment, and adaptability 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004). Following a strategy of temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999), we analyzed coded data within 
each phase and extracted the organizational practices that balanced alignment and adaptability. Subsequently, we conducted 
an analysis across phases to identify the mechanisms that caused ambidexterity to increase or decrease.
RESULTS
Ambidextrous project portfolio management involves balancing alignment (mainly monitoring existing projects based on 
plan-driven principles) with adaptability (mainly identifying new projects based on agile principles). In the following, we 
assess how the action research project transformed project portfolio management as summarized in Table 2.
Diagnosis Phase
Context. During the diagnosis phase, TelSoft employees were not disciplined in managing projects and they did not stretch 
themselves to reach beyond stated objectives. Instead, poor performance management was exhibited in three major ways. 
First, each project manager had considerable autonomy, and there were no rewards for either project failure or success. As a 
result, project outcomes varied considerably. For instance, the TelSoft project manager for one major client prioritized high 
quality over controlling cost, scope, and time. His projects therefore frequently missed deadlines and exceeded budgets. 
Long-time project managers faced no threat of being replaced, and developers had limited opportunities for promotions or 
increased responsibilities. Financial incentives were not given for exemplary performance, resulting in low morale among 
employees who had not received a raise in three years. Second, there was no process for allocating scarce talent across 
projects to ensure the company’s profitability. TelSoft  had four key engineers who had to be spread across three projects. 
TelSoft privileged requests from major clients over requests from internal customers which jeopardized the productivity of 
the company as a whole. Finally, TelSoft did not facilitate or encourage employee training and development.
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Table 1: Data Sources by Project Phases
The level of trust and support that existed in relationships at TelSoft reveals both strong and weak elements of the social 
support context. TelSoft’s VP of Software had worked with several of his direct reports for over 15 years and a friendly, 
comfortable relationship existed. When cost overruns and blown schedules occurred, the VP’s displeasure was tempered by a 
belief that managers were committed to doing the best job they could. TelSoft’s management team also had strong customer 
relationships, allowing customer requests to guide innovation projects. Although the major customers appreciated TelSoft’s 
responsiveness to their requests, they also wanted TelSoft to be more proactive in product innovation.
TelSoft’s management team was uncomfortable with how the Division President set direction for product innovations. The 
VP of Software claimed that the Division President operated based upon hunches, reacting to events emotionally or 
intuitively. As a result, company-sponsored product innovations were often not aligned well with the market. 
Content. TelSoft’s capability for alignment was evident. Employees rallied behind some project managers to ensure the 
completion of assigned work, although the strength of alignment varied across project managers. TelSoft continued to select 
projects reactively and lacked a shared long-term product strategy. In this way, TelSoft lacked adaptability. TelSoft employees 
focused on known products and were reluctant to invest their effort in new directions. There were no systems in place for 
assessing products and improving them. Although TelSoft quickly responded to customer requests, it had a dismal track 
record when it came to responding to market dynamics.
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Visioning Phase
A new Division President arrived June 2005 and approved money for innovating software processes, including project 
portfolio management. The research team and VP of Software created a detailed plan for a software coordination group 
(SCG). The SCG group would meet monthly and follow a fixed agenda covering current projects, business opportunities, 
improvement initiatives, and strategy. The SCG would consist of four TelSoft employees: Division President, Vice President 
(VP) of Software, Development Manager, and Product Manager. In November 2005, a kick-off meeting was held to ensure 
that each member understood his role in the group and to allow refinements to the initial agenda.
Process.  Three important events occurred during the visioning phase. First, the SCG clarified the company’s mission, 
targeted markets, and operating policies. Following the agility principles of the sense-and-respond model (Haeckel, 1995, 
1999), the SCG collaborated with the CEO to create a “reason for being” and a software strategy. Nine specific policies 
contained in the software strategy were contributed by members from all levels of the organization. Policies included 
requiring approval of the quality assurance department before delivering official releases, and managing each development 
project with a two-phase approach that separated requirements and development activities. Collectively, the reason for being, 
software strategy, and policies became known as TelSoft’s software charter. 
Second, the SCG agreed to use key performance indicators (KPIs) for assessing current projects. The VP of Software 
reinstituted the practice of weekly status reports from all project managers. The Development Manager assumed 
responsibility for collecting the information and distributing it to SCG team members before each meeting.
Third, the SCG began reviewing new business opportunities. The Product Manager prepared a template for justifying 
investments based on cost-benefit analysis. During the first two meetings, he used this template to present two proposals for 
enhancing TelSoft’s existing product line. While this was a step in the right direction, both proposals represented 
uncontroversial ideas that already enjoyed broad support by the other SCG members.
Context. The visioning phase saw some improvements to performance management, specifically in the desire to become 
more disciplined about monitoring and tracking the company’s performance objectives. The SCG was committed to the idea 
of using reliable project information to facilitate project portfolio management. They wanted to use KPI monitoring as an 
“early warning system” which would provide time for corrective actions. They also hoped tracking KPIs would inspire 
project managers to improve. However, contextual factors prevented TelSoft from realizing these benefits. The biggest 
problem was that information supplied by project managers was frequently in an unsuitable format, incomplete, or submitted 
too late. The SCG tolerated these information quality issues and did not hold the project managers accountable.
Another problem involved the market intelligence underlying business cases. When the SCG members asked questions 
during his presentation, the Product Manager admitted that he lacked supporting evidence for many of his assumptions. At 
one point the VP of Software called the estimates in the business case “outrageous.” Despite such problems, the group 
decided to pursue one of the opportunities presented.
There was also improvement to the social support context, particularly in the new Division President’s approach to strategic 
planning. The software charter was created collaboratively and shared within the organization. The commitment to the action 
research project showed a willingness to break with tradition and consider alternative ways of thinking. With respect to 
product innovation, the Division President wanted anyone within the organization to be able to suggest new business 
possibilities and referred to the Product Manager as the “gatekeeper of opportunities”. Generally, the SCG members were 
open to direction, criticism, and new ways of thinking from the researchers. 
Content. During the visioning phase, alignment was increased among SCG members through the creation of systems for 
defining, debating, and modifying performance against business objectives. The software strategy and reason for being were 
explicit, shared understandings of criteria for assessing product innovations. The fixed agenda documented important areas to 
be discussed each month. Agreement on KPIs specified key business objectives to the project managers at TelSoft. Although 
beliefs were changing among members of the SCG, it was too early to tell whether others outside the SCG would adapt their 
behavior based upon these systems. With respect to adaptability, the SCG struggled to think radically about new markets. In 
fact, the business cases proposed were largely targeting traditional markets. Yet, commitment to monthly SCG meetings and 
openness to ideas from the researchers were promising signs that changes to adaptability could take place. 
Intervening Phase
The intervening phase began in January 2006, the first meeting in which the Development Manager provided data about 
current projects using the KPIs. The key characteristic of this phase was the SCG’s uncertainty in interpreting information 
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that was brought to its meetings. This uncertainty continued through July 2006, at which point the group began to base 
decisions more confidently on the data presented.
Process. The SCG spent substantial time extending practices initiated during the visioning phase. The software charter was 
communicated to employees through workshops and to external customers through a letter from the Division President. 
Project managers began reporting KPIs on time; however, data tracking performance were not always accurate. In response, 
the VP of Software developed a tool to retrieve data from the time tracking system automatically. In addition, instead of 
presenting detailed business cases justifying a specific software innovation, the Product Manager reported on the list of sales 
leads being pursued and the status of those leads. 
The SCG also introduced periodic customer account reviews as an important new practice. In these reviews, the project 
managers reflected on the performance of recent releases, identified open issues, and talked about future business 
opportunities. These formal reviews held project managers accountable to the new Division President. At the same time, 
attending the SCG meetings allowed project managers to learn about the SCG and the importance of KPI data. 
Context. During the intervening phase, project managers were held more accountable for project performance, and feedback 
was used to improve performance. The VP of Software enforced the discipline of weekly written status reports and instituted 
periodic oral customer account reviews. One noticeable feature during this phase was that the SCG members began to use 
data to identify troubled projects. Some project managers reported their projects were “going smoothly” even though 
evidence suggested otherwise. In these cases, the VP of Software accepted responsibility for following up with project 
managers. 
As monthly KPI reports continued to show that most projects missed deadlines and went over budget, TelSoft’s project 
managers were urged to stretch themselves to meet project goals. Also, more pressure was placed on project managers to 
provide reliable project information, which in turn revealed problems with the social support context. Gathering project 
information required people throughout the organization to work together. Project managers created overall plans; the 
development coordinator scheduled developers for specific tasks; developers provided status against those plans; and project 
managers adjusted plans. Project managers complained that developers did not provide appropriate estimates. For their part, 
project managers did not always adjust plans to reflect what was learned as requirements solidified. Overall, this lack of 
coordination and communication among project managers, the development coordinator, and developers caused confusion 
and prevented progress. Other social support problems reduced project performance. Projects remained open and incurred 
costs long after development work was complete.
Content. During the intervening phase, TelSoft was more successful with adaptability, as they tried new tactics to attract 
potential customers. They purchased a new contact management system to track sales leads and pursue customers outside 
traditional markets. Breaking with the tradition of responding to customer requests, TelSoft managers proactively planned to 
revive an earlier product that had failed. This product vision was shared with one of the major customers for feedback on 
attractive features. Although the potential for financial sponsorship was uncertain, TelSoft managers felt this exercise would 
provide useful insights. 
Practicing Phase
The practicing phase began in August 2006 and ended February 2007, when the research collaboration ended. During this 
phase, the SCG focused on practicing project portfolio management as developed over the previous phases. Also, toward the 
end of the phase, we interviewed several employees about the impact of the initiative as well as the effectiveness of the SCG.
Process. During the practicing phase, the SCG continued to meet and became an integral part of the management structure at 
TelSoft. There were several areas of improvement: the VP of Software took more ownership of meetings with less interaction 
from the researchers; the software charter was posted to the company’s website and shared face-to-face with management 
representatives from major clients; and a new procedure for conducting post-project reviews was created. Furthermore, the 
Division President and CEO agreed to continue working with the research team for another year to develop the project 
management capabilities of selected employees. Not all changes were positive, however. During this phase, TelSoft
experienced loss of market intelligence when one of its two sales people resigned. The poor quality of metrics during current 
project reviews also persisted.
Context. The practicing phase was characterized by more critical discussions and questioning during project reviews, again 
trying to use the metrics to make decisions. There was an increased emphasis on holding project managers accountable. The 
group realized that KPI reports were not the early warning system they had imagined; projects still were over budget and 
delayed. However, the managers wanted to consider more systematically why these failures occurred in the past and how 
they could be avoided in the future. 
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Content. Alignment among SCG members continued to grow. The software charter made non-SCG members aware of the 
company’s strategic direction. However, there remained opportunities for working more coherently across levels of the 







Low Some improvement Major improvement Neutral
CONTEXT:
Social Support
Mixed Some improvement Some setbacks Some improvement
CONTENT:
Alignment
Mixed Neutral Neutral Major improvement
CONTENT:
Adaptability
Low Neutral Some improvement Some improvement
Table 2: Becoming Ambidextrous at TelSoft
DISCUSSION
In the spirit of building theory from process data and case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Langley, 1999), we propose a four-phase model for building ambidextrous software management capability in Table 2. The 
model incorporates contextualist inquiry’s two-dimensional approach by focusing on the vertical interaction between content 
and context and the horizontal unfolding of the change process across four phases. At TelSoft, managers first dealt with 
contextual issues (social support and performance management) before realizing improvements to content (alignment and 
adaptability). In fact, the main emphasis during the visioning phase was not on improving ambidexterity per se, but rather on 
transforming the context to better facilitate ambidexterity. The visioning phase focused on creating shared beliefs among 
SCG members with respect to performance management and social support through exercises such as creating a reason-for-
being statement, and crafting a software strategy with specific policies. Actions during the intervening phase also 
concentrated on transforming context, this time yielding some improvements in adaptability. Finally, the practicing phase 
saw changes to both context and content. Given that nearly ten months passed before impacts on alignment and adaptability 
became visible suggests that becoming ambidextrous is a long-term process requiring managerial patience.
Our findings have important implications for research into software management. The results from TelSoft suggest that it is 
possible to overcome the traditional dichotomy between plan-driven and agile principles by developing contextual 
ambidexterity. At TelSoft, these efforts focused on project portfolio management and bridged individual, project, and 
organizational levels. TelSoft benefited from combining concepts from contextual ambidexterity and contextual inquiry (see 
Figure 1 and Table 2). 
Future research could overcome three limitations of this study:  the single-case design that does not allow for comparisons 
across contrasting contexts; the narrow focus on project portfolio management that does not consider insights across different 
innovation initiatives; and our restricted conceptualization of organizational context relying on Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004). Future research could enrich theory by inducing different aspects of organizational context that influence the process 
of becoming ambidextrous to transcend traditional dichotomies within software management. 
Our findings also have implications for practicing software managers seeking to create ambidextrous practices. Our analysis 
of the change process indicates the value of structuring such efforts into discrete phases within which various aspects of 
context and content receive emphasis. For example, we discovered the importance of addressing contextual issues early so 
that the proper conditions (social support, heightened performance management) for improving other capabilities are 
established. Over time, managers should anticipate such shifts between improvements in context and content. The 
experiences from TelSoft also suggest that software managers seeking to overcome the traditional dichotomy between plan-
Diagnosis Visioning Intervening Practicing
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driven and agile principles should focus on practices that transcend the boundaries of single software projects and engage 
stakeholders representing management, software development, sales, and customers. Project portfolio management proved to 
be a suitable place to start, because it directly relates to current project performance as well as to investments in future 
opportunities.
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